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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States federal government must strengthen its
relationships to better design, build, manage, and defend the
information infrastructure on which American society and security
now depends. Our lives are now inextricably tied to the information
that surrounds us. We use an ever-expanding set of devices to access
this information and to create order from the chaotic jumble of facts,
figures, downloads, and databases that confront us in our professional
and our personal lives.
The overwhelming nature of the information age also challenges
traditional governance structures. The federal government finds itself
managing its interactions with data that is growing at a significant
* Executive Director, Directorate of Plans and Policy, United States Cyber Command. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
or position of the Department of Defense or any part of the U.S. Government. This article is
derived entirely from open source material and contains no classified information. It is
intended to depict the enduring complexity and range of issues and relationships entailed
in organizing cyber security policy and implementation at the federal level, even though the
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rate. It is responsible for creating, managing, and securing a large
portion of the terabytes of information needed to ensure national
security, maintain diplomatic relationships with other nations, collect
taxes, provide benefits, enforce laws, and the myriad other duties
needed for a population of more than 312 million people. Information
networks, data storage, and management systems play a role in every
function of today's federal government. Driven by the financial and
access benefits of information technology, the federal government has
become as reliant on information systems as the U.S. population, if
not more so.
Because of this reliance on computers for governance, the federal
government must ensure that U.S. information systems are resilient
against mechanical breakdown and protected against a wide variety of
mischief-makers who seek to disable information networks, whether
for the mere challenge of the exercise, or for more nefarious purposes.
Strong operational relationships are necessary for the
management and protection of federal networks because no single
federal branch, department, or agency has the authority or resources
to operate and defend the interconnected systems needed to perform
government functions. Just as different elements of the government
designed and built information systems for their particular needs, the
authorities over these networks have evolved without conscious
design or structure. The major player in government information
technology is not the government at all-it is the operators of the large
capacity fiber-optic networks over which the majority of federal data
flows: private sector Internet service providers.
These private sector entities have invested in infrastructure
improvements and technology development at a rate with which the
federal government cannot compete. After years of relatively generous
federal spending, the budget horizon looks ominous. According to the
Congressional Budget Office,"[t]he budget deficit in fiscal year 2011
will total nearly $1.3 trillion."' With significant federal budget
reductions, government departments and agencies that do not
maintain strong operational relationships with government and non-
governmental partners will be overwhelmed by resource constraints,
will mismanage the operation and protection of their networks, and
will put other systems at risk because of the interconnected nature of
information systems.
1 The History and Drivers of our Nation's Debt and Its Threats: Hearing Before the Joint
Select Comm. on Deficit Reduction, 112th Cong. 56 (2011) (prepared statement of Douglas
W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office) (At 8.5 % of GDP, this year's deficit
will be the third-largest shortfall in the past sixty-five years, exceeded only by those in
2009 (at 1o.o %) and 2010 (at 8.9 %)).
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Funding constraints are one reason for strong cyber operational
relationships, but the need for visibility into the health and status of
government networks is another. Multiple federal systems may be
linked together, but only the department, agency, or private sector
owner has the ability to monitor, identify, and understand the
performance of their respective networks. Shared situational
awareness enables the rapid identification of malicious activity or
unauthorized access across all systems. A threat to a small private
sector Internet service provider may also become a threat to large
federal entities because of the nature of the Internet. A threat to one is
now a threat to all. Without trusted operational cyber-relationships
within the federal government and between the government and
private sector, adequate cyber threat information sharing will not
happen.
Even with robust operational relationships, a detrimental cyber
event may still occur. If a cyber event disrupts the provision of
government services to the U.S. population, these functions must be
restored and the loss of connectivity mitigated as quickly as possible.
Hurricane Katrina provided dramatic lessons of the importance of
interagency coordination and operational relationships during crises
that cause widespread chaos, destruction, and communication
outages. The weaker the relationships among federal departments and
agencies and between the government and the private sector, the
longer mitigation will take, and the more the problems will be
widespread.
A natural disaster or mechanical failure may challenge the
government's cyber coordination abilities, but a traditional military
crisis would rapidly overwhelm an unprepared government. Although
it is unlikely that a cyber attack would stand alone as a single
adversarial action against the United States, the speed and distributed
nature of such an attack would require close coordination between the
public and private sectors, and within the national security
bureaucracy. It is likely that information network capabilities would
be used to nullify the conventional advantage of the U.S. military. The
unique characteristics of cyber attacks2 require operational
2 See Jonathan Masters, Confronting the Cyber Threat, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(2011), available at http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-policy/confronting-
cyber-threat/pl5577. First, they are often asymmetric, meaning that actors with limited
financial or technical resources have the capability to compromise high-value targets.
Second, offense has the advantage in the digital realm. The web's collaborative nature
means openness is prioritized over security. This design feature ensures cyber defenses lag
behind offensive methods. Finally, investigations into cyber attacks suffer from a so-called
attribution problem.
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relationships that are agile, innovative, and do not only respond to
threats quickly, but also anticipate potential adversarial actions and
coordinate responses before U.S. national interests are damaged or
destroyed.
Close federal cyber relationships are necessary because of the
limited cyber authorities of each department and agency, the limited
resources available to these departments and agencies to operate
independent networks, the need for shared informational awareness,
and the need for coordinated responses to foreign cyber threats. This
article characterizes the operational relationships among federal
government organizations with significant cyber security roles. It
describes the strengths and weaknesses of those relationships and
makes recommendations as to how to improve the cooperation and
collaboration within the federal government. The relationships
between the public sector and the private sector are then examined
with descriptions of their strengths and weakness. The article
concludes with recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of
these relationships.
II. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY CYBERSECURITY
OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has regularly
designated federal information security as a high-risk area since
1997.3 High-risk designations are for programs that are determined to
have serious weaknesses, while involving significant resources and
providing important public services. According to GAO:
Executive branch agencies, in particular DHS, also
need to improve their capacity to protect against cyber
threats by, among other things, advancing cyber
analysis and warning capabilities, acquiring sufficient
analytical and technical capabilities, developing
strategies for hiring and retaining highly qualified
cyber analysts, and strengthening the effectiveness of
the public-private sector partnerships in securing cyber
critical infrastructure.4
3 See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-278, REPORT TO CONGRESS HIGH RISK
SERIES: AN UPDATE 101 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11278.pdf.
4 Id. at 102.
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The departments with the largest cybersecurity budgets are the
departments of Defense and Homeland Security. "For fiscal year 2012,
the two [departments] requested a combined $3.4 billion in cyber-
related funds (yet to be approved)."5 The cooperation between these
departments was formalized in a memorandum of agreement in
September 2010 permitting the exchange of personnel to facilitate
communication of each department's priorities and improve
information sharing.6 Relationships between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the private sector have also improved with the
establishment of the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force,
which aims to "coordinate, integrate, and share information related to
all domestic cyber threat investigations."7 The task force includes
eighteen intelligence and law enforcement organizations working to
anticipate and prevent future cyber exploitations and to investigate
the sources of illicit network activities. However, despite this progress,
there are a number of challenges to effective federal interagency
operational relationships in cybersecurity.
A. CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
First, the federal government is very large. With a total budget of
over $3.5 trillion in 2010, the federal government dwarfs the size of
any private sector organization. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the federal government is the largest employer in United
States.8 It is divided into three branches with unequal percentages of
the federal workforce. The legislative branch is the smallest,
employing approximately one percent of the federal workforce. The
judicial branch is next, employing two percent. Far outpacing the
other branches, the executive branch employs approximately ninety-
seven percent of the federal civilian workforce (excluding Postal
5 Masters, supra note 2.
6 See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep't of Homeland Sec. and the Dep't of
Def. Regarding Cybersecurity (Sept. 27, 2010), available at
http://ww w.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/20101013-dod-dhs-cyber-moa.pdf.
7 See National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://ww w.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/ncijtf (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
8 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CAREER GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES, 2010-
11 EDITION, available at http://ww w.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgso4l.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2012) (The federal government employs approximately two million people).
2012] 281
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Service workers).9 Each of the federal branches, departments, and
agencies has at least one network it uses to communicate and to
execute its responsibilities.
Second, exact statistics on how many networks are operated by the
federal departments are difficult to find.1o This makes knowing how
many connections exist between the Internet and government
networks difficult to estimate. The Department of Homeland Security
oversees the management of an unknown number of civilian executive
branch networks. The Department of Defense oversees the
management of 15,000 military networks." The number of
connections between different networks is determined by the nature
of the network, the transactions supported by the network, the in-
house applications on different networks, and data-flow efficiencies.
Thus, there may be a single connection or multiple connections
between any two individual networks. Under the Trusted Internet
Connections initiative announced in November 2007, the Office of
Management and Budget sought to standardize and secure links
between individual federal networks and external, non-federal
networks-including the Internet.12 In January 2008, the number of
these connections was reported to be more than 4,300.13 If each of
these connections is estimated to be associated with only ten
networks-a conservatively low number-then the department would
be responsible for operating and defending more than 43,000
networks.
9 Id.
10 A network is the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components for the
collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination, and disposition of
information. This is an adaptation of the definition provided by the Department of
Defense. JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 161, JP 1-02 (2012), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new pubs/jplO2.pdf (defining information system).
11 William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 98.
12 See Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of
the President, to the Heads of Executive Dep'ts & Agencies, (NoV. 20, 2007), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2008/mo8-05.pdf.
13 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRUSTED INTERNET CONNECTIONS (TIC) INITIATIVE:
STATEMENT OF CAPABILITY EVALUATION REPORT 2 (20o8) available at
http://ww w.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov docs/2008 TIC SOC
EvaluationReport.pdf.
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The Department of Defense has described in great detail the
information systems for which it is responsible. According to the
former Deputy Secretary of Defense:
Information technology enables almost everything the
U.S. military does: logistical support and global
command and control of forces, real-time provision of
intelligence, and remote operations. Every one of these
functions depends heavily on the military's global
communications backbone, which consists of 15,000
networks and seven million computing devices across
hundreds of installations in dozens of countries. More
than 90,ooo people work full time to maintain it. In
less than a generation, information technology in the
military has evolved from an administrative tool for
enhancing office productivity into a national strategic
asset in its own right. The U.S. government's digital
infrastructure now gives the United States critical
advantages over any adversary, but its reliance on
computer networks also potentially enables adversaries
to gain valuable intelligence about U.S. capabilities and
operations, to impede the United States' conventional
military forces, and to disrupt the U.S. economy. 14
The U.S. government remains configured in an Industrial Age
structure. There have been incremental advancements in the use of
information technology, but these changes have been institutionalized
in isolated contexts without regard for the benefits of a unifying
strategic vision. Our current circumstances present evolving and
exponentially increasing cyber threats to federal systems, including
unauthorized access to personally identifiable information,15 data theft
or exploitation, unauthorized access to government data, and cyber
and financial crimes.
14 Lynn, supra note 11, at 98.
15 See U.S. Gov'TACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o8-536 1, PRIVACY: ALTERNATIVES EXIST
FOR ENHANCING PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (2oo8), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do8536.pdf (Personally identifiable information
includes any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including (1) any
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name,
Social Security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, or biometric
records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as
medical, educational, financial, and employment information.).
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Broad changes to the structures within federal branches,
departments, and agencies are unlikely. In order to maximize the
efficiencies and capability of individual federal systems, strong
operational relationships are necessary. The government has
established some operational relationships among federal entities
with cybersecurity responsibilities, and there is limited effort to
improve collaboration and information sharing with the private
sector.
Through intelligence and law enforcement activities, and the
knowledge needed to merely operate large information networks, the
federal government has extensive data about the status of individual
networks, malicious activity on these networks, and the criminal
activity that may be facilitated through these networks. Information
sharing is necessary to capitalize on its value and produce
understanding. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11
Commission stated, "[t]he U.S. government has access to a vast
amount of information. When databases not usually thought of as
'intelligence,' such as customs or immigration information, are
included, the storehouse is immense."16 The same may be said for
cyber threat information. "The biggest impediment to all-source
analysis-to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots-is the human
or systemic resistance to sharing information."17
Anxiety over the loss of prosecutorial advantage, the compromise
of intelligence sources and methods, and civil liability for the private
sector has precluded the sharing of information among federal
branches, department, and agencies-and between the government
and the private sector.
While investment banks, defense contractors, and
other critical infrastructure owners have information
about intrusions into their own systems and networks,
they fear enforcement actions by regulators, suits by
plaintiffs' lawyers, and criticism associated with public
disclosure of security failures. Concerns such as these
make these private entities reluctant to share
information with the federal government. While federal
agencies know that their networks should be protected
in many of the same ways that private sector networks
16 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
416-17 (2004).
17 Id.
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are, concerns-including the opposition of privacy
advocates to technology that sniffs traffic in and out of
government systems-have slowed progress.18
Fear of the loss of departmental resources and authority, and the
perceived need to control information in and about federal agencies,
encourages unilateral approaches to federal network operations and
defense. The Center of Strategic and International Studies reported on
the unsatisfying progress in U.S. cybersecurity:
Unsurprisingly, protecting "turf' played a role [in
slowing cybersecurity progress]. Cyber functions are
scattered across the executive branch. Reorganization
could mean that some offices would have to surrender
control. The different offices argue that this would put
important equities that they now oversee at risk. Turf
concerns intertwine with the conceptual dispute over
innovation, economics, and the nature of the Internet.
The cabinet agencies also have little interest in
supporting a stronger White House role in
cybersecurity, as it would diminish their
independence.19
The incremental efforts made by the government are necessary but
remain insufficient, particularly when cyber threats are increasingly
sophisticated and numerous, and when it is likely that federal funds
will be significantly reduced. According to former Defense
Department official Franklin Kramer, although the current efforts to
improve federal cybersecurity are welcome, "an integrated
governmental strategy to meet that challenge has only begun and has
yet fully to take shape."20 Operational relationships are not yet mature
enough to adequately address the loss of resources, the loss or
18 Gus P. Coldebella & Brian White, Foundational Questions Regarding the Federal Role in
Cybersecurity, 4 J. OF NAT'L SECURITY L. AND POL'Y 233, 236-37 (2010).
19 cTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, COMM'N ON CYBERSECURITY FOR THE 44TH
PRESIDENCY, CYBERSECURITY Two YEARS LATER 4 (2011), available at
http://csis.org/files/publication/110128_Lewis-CybersecurityTwoYearsLater Web.pdf.
2o FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, CYBER SECURITY: AN INTEGRATED
GOVERNMENTAL STRATEGY FOR PROGRESS (2010), available at
http://ww w.acus.org/files/publication pdfs/4o3/Cyber%2oSecurity-
%20An%20Integrated%20oGovernmental%20Strategy%20ofor%20Progress.pdf.
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corruption of data, or the unauthorized access to national security
systems caused by inadequate network security measures.
Government defense contractors continue to lose terabytes of data,
U.S. critical infrastructure remains unprotected, and operational
relationships are not strong enough to engender trust among federal
organizations and between the public and private sectors.
The remaining sections of this article will describe the
cybersecurity roles and missions of some of the departments and
agencies within the executive branch. Descriptions of their
relationships with other parts of the government will be followed by
recommendations as to how to improve these relationships for better
cybersecurity for the United States.
III. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the
Department of Homeland Security assimilated more than twenty-two
federal agencies to better protect the United States from terrorism.21
The department has multiple cybersecurity budget lines and activities.
Two of the most active organizations within DHS reside within the
National Protection and Programs Directorate.
The Office of Infrastructure Protection coordinates terrorism risk-
reduction efforts for U.S. critical infrastructure.22 It requested $322.3
million for fiscal year 2012 operations.23 Within this office is the Office
of Cybersecurity and Communications, which oversees the "security,
resiliency, and reliability of the nation's cyber and communications
infrastructure."24 The department requested $614.2 million in fiscal
year 2012 operations.25
21 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101. In general, the primary
mission of the Department is to (1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (2)
reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and (3) minimize the damage,
and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.
22About the National Protection and Programs Directorate, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial-0794.shtm.
23 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 1987 (2011), available
at http://ww w.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressional-budget-justification-fy2012.pdf.
24 KRAMER, supra note 20.
25 Homeland Security Act of 2002, supra note 21.
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This funding and probably more, is meant to safeguard domestic
cyberspace. Other items within this budget include: $233.6 million to
accelerate EINSTEIN 326 deployment to prevent and detect intrusions
on computer systems, and to upgrade the National Cyber Security
Protection System, building an intrusion detection capability and
analysis capabilities to protect federal networks; $40.9 million to
support the department's efforts to strengthen federal network
security of large and small agencies by conducting an estimated sixty-
six network assessments to improve security across the federal
executive branch; $24.5 million to provide high-quality, cost-effective
virtual cybersecurity education and training to develop a robust
cybersecurity workforce; $1.3 million to enable DHS to coordinate
national cybersecurity operations and interface with the U.S.
Department of Defense's (DoD) National Security Agency (NSA) at
Fort Meade, Maryland; and $18 million for the Comprehensive
National Cybersecurity Initiative to support research and
development projects focused on strengthening the nation's
cybersecurity.27
The department's budget request for cybersecurity activities is
large because DHS has such broad responsibilities in protecting the
nation's cyber and critical infrastructure. The Secretary of Homeland
Security is responsible for "coordinating the overall national effort to
enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key resources
of the United States" and serves "as the principal federal official to
lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of efforts among
federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and
the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key
resources."28 Although Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7(HSPD 7) acknowledges that other departments and agencies have
26 See generally Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-11-881, Department of Homeland
Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security
Missions lo Years after 9/11 136 (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl1881.pdf. (EINSTEIN 3 is intended to be an intrusion
prevention system that is to automatically detect and respond appropriately to cyber
threats before harm is done.).
27 See generally DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2012 BUDGET IN BRIEF 11-12 (2012),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy20l2.pdf.
28 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 7 (2003)
[hereinafter HSPD 7], available at
http://www.dhs.gov,/xabout/laws/ge_1214597989952.shtm.
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cybersecurity roles, the Department of Homeland Security is the "focal
point for the security of cyberspace" for the federal government. 29
In its first Quadrennial Homeland Security review, DHS described
its mission to secure cyberspace by preventing malicious actors from
"effectively exploit[ing] cyberspace, impair[ing] its safe and secure
use, or attack[ing] the Nation's information infrastructure."3o To
achieve this goal, DHS must "[i]dentify and evaluate the most
dangerous threats to federal[,]civilian[,] and private-sector networks
and the Nation;" "[p]rotect and make resilient information systems,
networks, and personal and sensitive data;" "[p]revent cyber crime
and other malicious uses of cyberspace;" "[d]isrupt the criminal
organizations and other malicious actors engaged in high-
consequence or wide-scale cyber crime;" "[d]evelop a robust public-
private cyber incident response capability;" and "[m]anage cyber
incidents from identification to resolution in a rapid and replicable
manner with prompt and appropriate action."31
To manage its broad role, the Department of Homeland Security
has developed a set of guiding principles to focus the nation's
response to various potential events. This National Response
Framework32 contains multiple incident annexes that address "specific
contingency or hazard situations or an element of an incident
requiring specialized application of the Framework."33
The Cyber Incident Annex describes the responsibilities of
different governmental groups to "prepare for, respond to, and
recover from any cyber-related Incident of National Significance
29 Id. ("To the extent permitted by law, Federal departments and agencies with cyber
expertise, including but not limited to the Departments of Justice, Commerce, the
Treasury, Defense, Energy, and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency, will collaborate
with and support the organization in accomplishing its mission.").
30 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW 54 (2010),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr report.pdf.
31 Id. at 55-56.
32 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (2oo8), available at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf.
33 See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, National Resource Center Incident Annexes,
http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/incidentannexes.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012)
(The current annexes are: Biological Incident, Catastrophic Incident, Food and Agriculture
Incident, Mass Evacuation, Nuclear/Radiological Incident, Cyber Incident, Terrorism
Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation.).
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impacting critical national processes and the national economy."34 A
"cyber-related Incident of National Significance" is undefined, but
may include an "organized cyber attack," a widespread computer
virus, a "natural disaster with significant cyber consequences," or
other incidents "capable of causing extensive damage to critical
infrastructure of key assets."35 The Annex outlines the roles and
responsibilities of federal departments categorized as "Coordinating
Agencies, Cooperating Agencies, and Other Federal Entities."36 In the
event of a nationally significant cyber-related incident, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and
the Department of Justice are coordinating agencies and the
Departments of Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, State,
Transportation, and Treasury are all cooperating agencies.37
In addition to the National Response Framework's Cyber Incident
Annex, DHS has drafted the National Cyber Incident Response Plan to
establish the "framework for organizational roles, responsibilities, and
actions to prepare for, respond to, and begin to coordinate recovery
from a cyber incident."38 This plan is intended to expand upon the
information within the NRF's Cyber Incident Annex. This plan has
been in coordination for more than eighteen months and has yet to be
approved by the Executive Office of the President.
34 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., CYBER INCIDENT ANNEX CYB-2 (2004), available at
http://wAw.1earningservices.us/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrp-cyberincidentannex.pdf.
35 Id.
36 See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK,
EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION ANNEXES: INTRODUCTION (20o8), available at
http://wAw.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-annexes-all.pdf (Federal agencies
designated as coordinating agencies are responsible for implementation of processes
detailed in the annexes. Coordinating agencies support the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) incident management mission by providing the leadership, expertise, and
authorities to implement critical and specific aspects of the response. In accordance with
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, DHS retains responsibility for overall
domestic incident management. (Sup i); Cooperating agencies are those entities that have
specific expertise and capabilities to assist the coordinating agency in executing incident-
related tasks or processes. When the procedures within a Support Annex are needed to
support elements of an incident, the coordinating agency will notify cooperating agencies
of the circumstances (Sup ii).).
37 The Intelligence Community, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and
the Office of Management and Budget are also listed as cooperating agencies.
38 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN, INTERIM VERSION,
1 (2010).
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Despite the progress made by DHS with the as-yet-unapproved
National Cyber Incident Response Plan and the cyber annex to the
National Response Framework, the operational relationships between
DHS and other federal departments and agencies remain
underdeveloped. DHS's National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center (NCCIC) does not detail personnel to operations
centers maintained by the Department of Defense.39 There is limited
cooperative training between the DoD and DHS for cybersecurity
personnel and there is limited information sharing between the two
departments, despite the memorandum of agreement signed by the
secretaries of both departments.
DHS's National Cyber Security Division within the Office of
Cybersecurity and Communications created the U.S. Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) in 2003 to secure federal
information networks by coordinating the "defense against and
response to cyber attacks."40 it is the federal government's focal point
for interaction with executive branch and nonfederal entities on
computer network "analysis, warning, information sharing, major
incident response, and national-level recovery efforts." According to
the Government Accountability office:
[US-CERT] is charged with aggregating and
disseminating cybersecurity information to improve
warning of and response to incidents, increasing
coordination of response information, reducing
vulnerabilities, and enhancing prevention and
protection. In addition, the organization is to collect
incident reports from all federal agencies and assist
agencies in their incident response efforts. It is also to
accept incident reports when voluntarily submitted by
39 National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) is a 24x7
center responsible for the production of a common operating picture for cyber and
communications across the federal, state, and local government, intelligence and law
enforcement communities and the private sector. The NCCIC is operated within DHS'
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, a component of the National Protection &
Programs Directorate. About the National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center (NCCIC), DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://ww w.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc 13o6334251555.e (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
40 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY
READINESS TEAM MAKES PROGRESS IN SECURING CYBERSPACE, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 2
(2010) [hereinafter GAO, CHALLENGES REMAIN], available at
http://www.oig.dhs.govT/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-94_Juni0.pdf.
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other public and private entities and assist them in
their response efforts, as requested.41
US-CERT is a federal entity independent from the more than 250
global emergency teams addressing cyber incidents, including the
CERT@ Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon's
Software Engineering Institute.42 US-CERT does not have the
statutory or regulatory authority to enforce compliance with its
notices for mitigation of cyber threats. Additionally, according to the
DHS Inspector General, "US-CERT does not have sufficient staff to
perform its 24x7 operations as well as to analyze security information
timely."43
Its operational relationships with federal departments and
agencies and the private sector is hindered because of inadequate
information sharing based on security classification, network
configuration, and training issues. Other federal agencies claim that
US-CERT is "unable to share near real-time data and classified and
detailed information to address security incidents."44 Additionally, the
different networks operated by other departments and the intelligence
community challenge information sharing from US-CERT. Because of
classification limitations, US-CERT is limited in the information it can
post to its portals. Many agencies do not have classified networks or
secure facilities or personnel with the proper clearances to receive the
information.
DHS operational relationships would be improved if the
department had a strategy to achieve its cybersecurity roles and
missions. Other departments and agencies publish strategies to help
communicate their priorities and initiatives. But DHS's Office of
Cybersecurity and Communications has not developed "a strategic
41 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o8-588, CYBER ANALYSIS AND WARNING: DHS
FACES CHALLENGES IN ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CAPABILITY 14-15
(2008), available at http://wwx-.gao.gov/new.items/do8588.pdf.
42 See About Us, US-CERT, http://www.us-cert.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2012) (The first of these types of organizations was the CERT Coordination Center
(CERT/CC), established at Carnegie Mellon University in 1988. When the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) created US-CERT, it called upon the CERT/CC to contribute
expertise for protecting the nation's information infrastructure by coordinating defense
against and response to cyber attacks. Through US-CERT, DHS and the CERT/CC work
jointly on these activities.).
43 GAO, CHALLENGES REMAIN, supra note 40, at 7.
44 Id. at 12.
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implementation plan that outlines its responsibilities or establishes
specific objectives and milestones for enhancing cybersecurity or
protecting critical infrastructures."45
To improve the ability to work with other federal departments and
agencies, DHS should obtain the authority to enforce guidance from
US-CERT, recruit and retain adequate staff to fulfill US-CERT's
mission, and establish a strategic implementation plan documenting
its priorities to secure federal civilian information networks and
critical infrastructures. Combined training programs with other
departments and agencies would also help build operational
relationships and camaraderie needed for effective communication. If
implemented, these recommendations would put DHS on the road to
improved collaboration and better information sharing with other
parts of the federal government.
A. SECRET SERVICE
Reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secret Service is responsible for safeguarding the U.S. financial
infrastructure in order to "preserve the integrity of the economy, and
to protect national leaders, visiting heads of state and government,
designated sites and National Special Security Events."46 The USA
Patriot Act required the Secret Service to establish an Electronic
Crimes Task Force in order to prevent, detect, mitigate, and
investigate attacks on U.S. financial systems and critical
infrastructures. The establishment of the task force was prescient
considering the impact on the Dow Jones Industrial Average after a
trading algorithm malfunctioned in May 201047 and the February 2011
cyber attack against NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. The NASDAQ attack
45 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PLANNING, MANAGEMENT, AND
SYSTEMS ISSUES HINDER DHS' EFFORTS To PROTECT CYBERSPACE AND THE NATION'S CYBER
INFRASTRUCTURE (Redacted) 9 (2011), available at
http://ww w.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr 11-89 Junii.pdf.
46 U.S. SECRET SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
STRATEGIC PLAN (FY 2008 - FY 2013) 2 (20o8), available at
http://ww w.secretservice.gov/usss strategic plan_2008_2013.pdf.
47 See generally Alex Eichler, Lessons From the Algorithm-Fueled May 6 Flash Crash, THE
ATLANTIC WIRE (October 4, 2010), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/2010/10/
lessons-from-the-algorithm-fueled-may-6-flash-crash/22813.
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was serious enough to eventually involve the National Security Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.48
The popularity and proliferation of information technology has
enabled criminals to target financial systems, "compelling the
involvement of the Secret Service in combating cyber crime."49 The
unauthorized access into NASDAQ OMX-a global exchange
company-resulted in the insertion of "suspicious files" onto NASDAQ
servers. Although commodities trading systems were unaffected, the
intruders accessed cloud applications containing data stored by a
significant number of Fortune 500 companies and providing access to
"a rich mine of market-moving, inside information."5o There is a clear
role for a strong organizational element to monitor and protect U.S.
financial systems against cyber criminals, hackers, and state
competitors.
Also within the Secret Service is the National Threat Assessment
Center (NTAC), which provides assessments "within the Secret Service
and to its law enforcement and public safety partners." This
organization researched "illicit insider cyber activity" because this
type of activity often involves criminal activity such as "financial
fraud, computer fraud, electronic crimes, identity theft, and
computer-based attacks on the nation's financial, banking and
telecommunications infrastructures."51 Partnering with Carnegie
Mellon University's CERTo Coordination Center, NTAC examined
past instances in which current or former employees or contractors
harmed their organizations "via a computer or system/network for
purposes of intellectual property theft, fraud, and acts of sabotage."
NTAC's study identified physical, social, and online activity that
indicates an insider threat. The report identified behaviors in the
48 See generally Uri Friedman, Why the Financial World Is Spooked by Nasdaq Cyber
Attack, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (February 7, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/
2011/02/why-the-financial-world-is-spooked-by-nasdaq-cyber-attack/21203.
49 About the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Forces, U.S. SECRET SERV.,
http://ww w.secretservice.gov/ectf about.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
50 See generally Philip Stafford, Jeremy Grant and Telis Demos, Hacking Fears Raised by
Nasdaq OMXAttack, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011, available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/o/o638d37a-32fa-1leo-9a61-
ool44feabdco.html#axzzlVholGhLQ (listing financial exchanges targeted for computer
attacks since 1999).
5 National Threat Assessment Center, U.S. SECRET SERV.,
http://ww w.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
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banking and financial sector, the information technology and
telecommunications sector, and the government sector.5 2
The Secret Service has informational awareness into systems that
might not be the traditional vectors of a cyber attack. Its relationships
with the private financial sector make the Secret Service the best
candidate to share information from and with the financial services
industry. With the ability to deal with sensitive and classified
information, it does not face some of the challenges as do other
Department of Homeland Security elements such as US-CERT. DHS
should better leverage the Secret Service to gain better visibility into
the status of network operations and malicious activity known by the
financial industry. This is an example of a public-private partnership
that can have significant results with little budgetary or manpower
investment.
IV. JOINT COORDINATION ELEMENT
In September 2010, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Defense established a memorandum of agreement
under which both departments will "provide personnel, equipment,
and facilities in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in
strategic planning for the nation's cybersecurity, mutual support for
cybersecurity capabilities development, and synchronization of
current operational cybersecurity mission activities."53 The
memorandum established a Joint Coordination Element to improve
"joint operational planning, coordination, synchronization,
requirement translation, and other DHS mission support for
homeland security for cybersecurity" under the direct supervision of
the [DHS] Director, Cybersecurity Coordination.54 The Joint
Coordination Element is the best vehicle for departmental
collaboration, but remains understaffed and underutilized.
Testimony by Philip Reitinger, then the Deputy Undersecretary of
the National Protection and Programs Directorate before the Senate
Homeland Security Committee, in May 2011 strongly implied that the
Joint Coordination Element remained long on promises and short on
52 See id. for the actual reports and findings.
53 Memorandum ofAgreement to Enhance Coordination to Secure America's Cyber
Networks, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 22, 2011),
http://ww w.dhs.gov/files/publications/gC128698600419o.shtm.
54 DEP'T. OF DEF. AND DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 6.
[Vol. 8:2294
YOUNG
accomplishments. He stated that, while the DoD had "unparalleled
technical expertise and cyber security expertise built up over the
course of years," DHS has expertise in the interagency process. 55
Reitinger noted that DHS will be developing people to send to the
National Security Agency's (NSA) Threat Operations Center (NTOC).
He noted that the National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center (NCCIC) will accept personnel from NSA and the
United States Cyber Command, suggesting that individuals have yet to
be integrated into this cyber watch center. The Joint Coordination
Element thus remains a promising collaborative concept that has yet
to be fully leveraged for the benefit of U.S. cybersecurity.
The interdepartmental agreement identified an often-overlooked
element of cybersecurity: cyber acquisition. Given Moore's Law56 and
the rapid pace of technology development, traditional federal
acquisition practices are insufficient. The inadequacy of DoD cyber
acquisition practices was noted in the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2011.57 This act required "a strategy to provide for
the rapid acquisition of tools, applications, and other capabilities for
cyber warfare for the United States Cyber Command and the cyber
operations components of the military departments."58 The agreement
between the two departments acknowledges this need by requiring
DHS to send personnel to the National Security Agency to collaborate
on acquisition and technology development. This is another promising
initiative that has yet to produce any public result.
The Joint Coordination Element is a good first step for improved
collaboration and a strong operational relationship between the two
departments with the largest cyber- responsibilities and the largest
55 Obama Administration Global Cybersecurity Plan: Hearing Before the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 112th Cong. (May 11, 2011), as
seen on C-SPAN, available at http://c-spanarchives.org/videoLibrary/
clip.php?appid= 600013415.
56 See DOROTHY E. DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 294-95 (1999) (For the
past several decades, the number of transistors that can be placed on a single [micro
processing] chip has approximately doubled every eighteen months owing to advances in
manufacturing. The effect has been a corresponding doubling of processing speed in
instructions per second and memory capacity in bytes per chip, with a factor of loo
improvements every five years and a factor of loo improvements every decade. This
phenomenon is called Moore's law, after the founder of and chairman of Intel, Gordon
Moore, who first observed and posited it.).
57 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 933.
58 Id.
2012] 295
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
budgets. To realize the full potential of the JCE, both departments
should make staffing the joint organization with knowledgeable
personnel from each of them a high priority. Both departments may
consider making a tour in the JCE a requirement for selection to
particular ranks or for selection for particular positions. Both
departments should consider providing more public information on
the status of the Joint Element. The memorandum of agreement was a
visionary first step, but now comes the true test of the commitment to
the operational relationship between the departments.
V. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
"As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized
cyberspace as a new domain of warfare."59 The 2011 National Military
Strategy describes the department's perspective on cyberspace:
Cyberspace capabilities enable Combatant
Commanders to operate effectively across all domains.
Strategic Command and Cyber Command will
collaborate with U.S. government agencies, non-
government entities, industry, and international actors
to develop new cyber norms, capabilities,
organizations, and skills. Should a large-scale cyber
intrusion or debilitating cyber attack occur, we must
provide a broad range of options to ensure our access
and use of the cyberspace domain and hold malicious
actors accountable. We must seek executive and
Congressional action to provide new authorities to
enable effective action in cyberspace. 6o
The Defense Department operates its own worldwide information
network, known as the Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG is a
"globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities
for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing
information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support
59 Lynn, supra note 11, at 101.
60 NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2011: REDEFINING
AMERICA'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 10 (2011) (emphasis added), available at
http://wwxwjcs.mil/content/files/2011-02/020811084800 2011 NMS_-
o8_FEB_2011.pdf.
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personnel." 61 It includes networks and systems that are government-
owned and leased from the private sector. Without these information
networks, DoD would be unable to command and control its military
forces, provide logistical support, provide intelligence or
communicate.
DoD has an information architecture that includes "15,000
networks and seven million computing devices across hundreds of
installations in dozens of countries." 62 According to the Unified
Command Plan-the document describing the responsibilities of the
department's combatant commands-U.S. Strategic Command is
responsible for coordinating cyberspace operational planning and
directing GIG operations and defense. 63 As a subordinate unified
command, 64 United States Cyber Command was established in 2009
to organize, plan, and conduct activities to direct the operations and
defense of specified Department of Defense information networks; to,
"when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace
operations" in order to enable actions in all domains; and to "ensure
U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while denying the
same to our adversaries." 65
61 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 8000.01, MANAGEMENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION ENTERPRISE 10 (2009), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directiv es/corres/pdf/8oooolp.pdf.
62 Lynn, supra note 11, at 98.
63 See Unified Command Plan, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
http://ww w.defense.gov/home/features/2009/olo9-unifiedcommand (last updated Apr.
27, 2011) (The Unified Command Plan is a key strategic document that establishes the
missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of
combatant commands. UCP 2011, signed by President Obama on April 6, 2011, assigns
several new missions to the combatant commanders.).
64 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 1o (A command established by commanders of
unified commands, when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with
the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be
established on an area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands
have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified
commands and exercise operational control of assigned commands and forces within the
assigned operational area.).
65 United States Cyber Command Fact Sheet, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND,
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/CyberCommand (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
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It has been reported that the Defense budget request for
cybersecurity operations is $3.2 billion for fiscal year 2012.66 This
request will fund improved information assurance for DoD agencies
and "non-information assurance initiatives that are critical to the
department's cyber stance." This large funding request pays for DoD
public key infrastructure, communications security, military cyber
operations, cyber research and technology, and forensic analysis
conducted by the Defense Cyber Crime Center. 67
This impressive funding illustrates the priority the Department of
Defense places on cybersecurity. This effort is good for national
security, but DoD is but one part of the national cybersecurity
establishment. The federal government must continue to improve
internal government and external partner operational relationships to
better address the threats and consequences of cyber conflict. More
importantly, the Defense Department must make its capabilities more
available for the benefit of other federal departments and agencies.
An example of how Defense Department capabilities may be
applied outside of DoD agencies is the pilot program outlined by then
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn in June 2011. According to
the American Forces Press Service, the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
Cyber Pilot involves sharing classified threat information with
participating defense contractors or with the companies' Internet
service providers.68 According to Lynn, "the government will not
monitor, intercept or store any private-sector communications
through the program." The intelligence provided by DoD merely helps
the DIB companies "to identify and stop malicious activity within their
networks." 69 The Department of Homeland Security is a partner in the
DIB Cyber Pilot.
This pilot program is the singular example of how DOD cyber
capabilities can assist organizations outside the Defense Department.
It is admittedly easier for the department to work with the defense
industrial base companies with which it has had relationships for
decades than to extend its protections beyond traditional defense
66 Aiya Sternstein, Pentagon Seeks $3.2 Billion for Revised Cyber Budget, NEXTGOV.COM
(Mar.24, 2011), http://wAw.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20110324_2474.php?oref=rss.
67 Id.
68 John D. Banusiewicz, Lynn Outlines New Cybersecurity Effort, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS
SERV. (June 16, 2011), available at
http://ww w.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id= 64349.
69 Id.
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contractors. More programs like the DIB Cyber Pilot should be
developed to leverage the experience and prior investment made to
mature defense cyber capabilities. Lynn made a similar claim earlier
this year stating that the "DIB Cyber Pilot could serve as an example of
how a larger effort aimed at protecting the nation's critical
infrastructure-its power grid, transportation system, financial system
and other components-might work."7o
The DIB Cyber Pilot and the Joint Coordination Element should
inform how DoD capabilities can be leveraged to protect networks
beyond its own. The Department of Defense exists and is funded to
protect the United States and all of the country's interests; it was not
created to protect itself. The debate about how DoD capabilities can
inform and assist non-DoD cybersecurity efforts should be conducted
openly and frequently. According to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, "an executive order or some other presidential
document to guide military and intelligence activities in protecting
critical infrastructure" would be the most visible and public statement
of leveraging well-developed military capability to defend the nation's
networks. "Since any decision will require working with those outside
the government, a highly-classified, un-releasable document, like the
2008 Comprehensive National Cyber Initiative (CNCI), will be
inadequate."71
Despite DoD's recognized technical expertise, the general public
appears resistant to allowing DoD to protect the nation by defending
non-DoD information networks.72 DoD has an image problem. "Even
if existing legal authorities allow for an expanded DoD role in
defending critical infrastructure, the 'perception problem' remains
significant."73 Those resistant to a larger role for the military in
protecting civilian networks are motivated by concerns for civil
liberties and privacy.
In a recent report, the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the
44th Presidency noted, "We do not advocate changing the traditional
70 Id.
71 CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, supra note 19, at lo.
72 See generally, Michael Hardy &John Zyskowski, DOD Cyber Defense Plan Draws Fire,
FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK (June 21, 2011), http://fcw.com/articles/2011/07/25/buzz-
cyber-defense-plan-panned.aspx; Declan McCullagh, U.S. Military Wants to "Protect" Key
Civilian Networks, CNET NEWS (July 14, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/83o1-31921_3-
20079500-281/u.s-military-wants-to-protect-key-civilian-networks.
73 CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, supra note 19, at 1o.
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separation that exists between military and civilian functions but
believe that the administration and Congress should clarify our
policies and laws to allow the military to fulfill its traditional role in
protecting against foreign threats. Finding a way to do this in
partnership with DHS and the private sector remains a fundamental
challenge for cybersecurity policy."74 The United States cannot afford
the resources to recreate the capabilities that have already been
developed for the military.
DoD's approach to cybersecurity is appropriate, but weaknesses
remain. These include the lack of an adequately trained and abundant
cyber workforce. There are only so many trained cyber professionals
available for the federal government, and only some have gone to the
better-resourced Defense Department. The military has a maturing
and systemic approach to developing professional specialties in
cybersecurity disciplines and will mature training to produce highly-
skilled network operators to defend military networks. This will
contribute to the comprehensive cybersecurity of the nation if these
maturing professionals rotate to other departments and agencies.
DHS has far fewer analysts and cyber professionals with the same
levels of security clearance as held by DoD. Without more cleared
personnel, information sharing between DHS and DoD is limited.
These issues illustrate the final weakness to be resolved to
operationalize the DHS-DoD relationship-speed. Without a faster
mechanism to share information and make decisions, with
appropriately cleared and well-trained personnel, the benefits of the
DHS-DoD relationship will be lost.
Beyond the need for larger numbers of skilled cybersecurity forces
and professionals, the Defense Department must carefully consider
the desire to overly classify specific capabilities and strategies. Cyber
warfare planning would benefit if more operations could be discussed
at lower levels of classification. "While there are good reasons to
highly classify and compartment some cyber matters, there is such
significant over-classification and compartmentation that planning
and operational integration is (sic) overly difficult."75 Some of this
over-classification is based on the intelligence sources from which the
Defense establishment learns its cyber threat information. The
method by which the intelligence community derives this threat
intelligence is highly-classified, leading to a derivative classification of
the cyber countermeasures or techniques.
74 Id.
75 KRAMER, supra note 20, at 4.
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A. UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND
Within the Department of Defense there are multiple elements
that participate in the department's cyber policy or operations.76 This
article focuses mainly on the operational military cyber element,
United States Cyber Command. This military organization-
subordinate to United States Strategic Command77-"plans,
coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to:
direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense
information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct
full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable
actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in
cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries."71
The command is co-located with the National Security Agency
(NSA) at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. The benefits of co-locating
Cyber Command with NSA have been described by General Keith
Alexander, Commander of Cyber Command and the Director of NSA:
[Former Secretary of Defense] Gates has said we can't
afford to replicate the hundreds of billions of dollars
that we've put into NSA to build another architecture
for Cyber Command and then yet others for different
government agencies. Instead, we need to leverage
existing investment and work collaboratively. NSA and
Cyber Command have separate staffs and operate
under different authorities. The capabilities of NSA and
its work force in the signals intelligence and
76 Office of the Secretary of Defense (responsible for coordinating the memorandum of
agreement with the Department of Homeland Security), Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy (supports the "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
and Assistant Security Defense for Global Strategic Affairs by developing and overseeing
the implementation cyber-related policies, strategies, and plans to promote stability in and
ensure continued freedom of access to the global commons of space and cyber in order to
achieve national security objectives." See Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Cyber Policy, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC'Y OF DEF. FOR CYBER POL'Y,
http://policy.defense.gov/gsa/cp/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
77 United States Strategic Command is responsible for nuclear capabilities, space
operations, global missile defense, and global command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. See About, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND, http://wwx-.stratcom.mil/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
78 U.S. Cyber Command Public Affairs Fact Sheet, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND,
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/CyberCommand (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
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information assurance fields are unsurpassed. This
intellectual and technical capital is critical to U.S.
government efforts in cyberspace. Cyber Command is a
military command that draws its authorities from Title
1o, but it relies on the success of real-time intelligence,
which is why the decision to collocate it with NSA was
not only wise, but also an imperative.79
Establishing the military command with NSA reflects a national
security compromise between capitalizing on NSA's technical
resources, the need to centralize military cyber activities, and a desire
to "balance legally-defined mission boundaries between the civilian
intelligence community and the military defense community."s0 The
most notable difficulty with the co-location of the command and NSA
is the distinction between the military Title to authority of the
Commander for Cyber Command and the intelligence Title 50
authority of the NSA Director.81 Some observers appear to disregard
the potential authority conflicts and believe that Cyber Command's
establishment is the most significant improvement for federal
cybersecurity.2
The benefits of interagency-or at least multi-agency advanced
planning cannot be overstated. "Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how
after-the-event coordination and planning was both untimely and
inadequate in dealing with the immediate aftermath of the disaster."8 3
Delays in interagency management can have significant operational
consequences not only in a natural disaster, but also in national
security scenarios. Effective coordination between Cyber Command
and NSA is necessary but not sufficient in the event of a national cyber
79 Harrison Donnelly, Q&A: General Keith B. Alexander, MILITARY INFO. TECH. (2010),
available at http://www.kmimediagroup.com/mit-home/288-mit-2010-volume-14-issue-
10-november/365o-qaa-general-keith-b-alexander.html.
80 James Barkley, Kevin Campbell & Joseph Roybal, Interagency Coordination @ Net
Speed: Recommendations to Maximize Interagency Coordination and Capabilities at U.S.
Cybercom, May 23, 2010, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
(quoting RICHARD A. CLARK & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR 34-44 (2010)) (on file with
the author).
81Id. Title 1o refers to that part of the United States Code governing the armed forces and
Title 50 governs most intelligence operations.
82 See Coldebella & White, supra note 18, at 4.
8 3 Id. at 25.
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emergency or attack. Cyber Command must provide a priori analysis
to the national security community about the resources and
manpower that are required to address a significant cyber event.
B. DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is a combat
support agency providing services to the U.S. military and its allies
with information networks and global communications. DISA
provides "joint and coalition enterprise infrastructure, information
sharing services, and command and control that enable joint
warfighting." Employing more than 7,300 civilian and military
personnel, the agency operates and maintains military networks and
integrated capabilities-including "national nuclear command
capabilities."8 4 It is responsible for the ".mil" network, systems
engineering, and interoperability testing, including "electromagnetic
spectrum planning, coordination, deconfliction, and management
services" for the Defense Department.85 DISA's appropriated budget
was over $2.5 billion for fiscal year 2011.86
The importance of DISA's contribution to U.S. military power is
often underestimated. An example of the important work done by the
agency is the Network Services directorate. This organization
"translates customers' long-haul network requirements into effective
voice, video and data network solutions; leverages proven and
emerging technologies to ensure joint interoperability, assured
security and best value; evaluates technical operations; and resolves
technical support issues for DoD's long-haul networks."87 It is also
responsible for the operation and maintenance of the military's
unclassified network,88 the military secret network, 89 and the various
military Network Operations Centers9o around the world.
84Agency Mission Essential Task List, DEF. INFO. Sys. AGENCY,
http://ww w.disa.mil/about/ourwork.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
85 Id.
86 Defense Information Systems Agency SNAPSHOT: A Summary of Facts and Figures,
DEF. INFO. Sys. AGENCY (Apr. 2011), available at
http://ww w.disa.mil/news/pressresources/agency snapshot.pdf.
87 DEF. INFO. Sys. AGENCY, http://www.disa.mil/ns/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
88 Network, Networking Technology, Data Communication Terms, Glossary and
Dictionary: NIPRNET: Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network, JAVVIN NETWORK
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One of the priorities highlighted in the DISA Campaign Plan is the
protection of "critical infrastructure in DISA and the Global
Information Grid (GIG)."91 Given the number of unauthorized
intrusions into Defense Department networks, protecting military
information that transits on military networks has become an
operational imperative. According to DISA's Fiscal Year (FY) 2012
Budget Estimates:
The current world environment mandates
comprehensive and integrated cyber protection for this
infrastructure to ensure the DoD has protected
information on protected networks. The DISA is
conducting a massive effort to improve the security and
defense capabilities of our military networks. These
include: improved sensors for intrusion detection and
reporting; demilitarized zones (DMZ) security;
filtering; and developing proxys to protect our core
network services from internet threats.92
MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY, http://www.javin.com/networkingterms/NIPRNET.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
89 Secret Internet Protocol Router Network: (SIPRNETNetwork Security Plan),
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/14976132/Secret-Internet-Protocol-Router-Network (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012).
90 The Global Network Operations and Security Center (GNOSC) provides situational
awareness of the myriad of networks, systems and applications that make up the Global
Information Grid (GIG) and protect/defend that grid from potential cyber threats.
Additionally, the GNOSC performs a Command Center function that provides a wide
variety of support to the Defense Information Systems Agency's (DISA) core mission areas.
91 DEF. INFO. Sys. AGENCY, DISA CAMPAIGN PLAN 10 (2011-2012). The Global Information
Grid is the terms once used to describe the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of
information capabilities, and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing,
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and
support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased
communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications),
data, security services, other associated services and National Security Systems. (See Joint
Publication 1-02, 154).
92 DEF. INFO. Sys. AGENCY, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET ESTIMATES 207-08 (2012), available
at http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy20l2/budget-justification/pdfs/
ol0Operation and Maintenance/OM VOL 1PARTS/O M VOL 1 BASEPARTS/D
ISA OP-5 _FY 2012.pdf.
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An examination of DISA's budget request yields mixed results given
the importance of network defense in a time of growing threats-
particularly to military systems. DISA arranges its resources into six
mission areas.93 The "GIG Network Operations and Defense" mission
area covers the operation, protection, defense, and sustainment of the
"enterprise infrastructure and information sharing services which
enable Command and Control."94 Yet, the funding for this mission
area has been reduced from $517 million in fiscal year 2011 to $445
million in fiscal year 2012.95
This reduction may not indicate DISA's lack of prioritizing
network security, as only two of the six operations funded under GIG
Network Operations and Defense resource line were actually reduced.
These two missions are to ensure "critical mission execution in the
face of cyber attacks"96 and "develop and implement Cybersecurity
plans, assessments, and strategies . . . ."97 It is significant to note,
however, that DISA's funding for support of the Defense Industrial
Base (DIB) grew by more than $5 million from FY11 to FY12. This
activity provides "information assurance/computer network defense
support to the DIB through rapid dissemination of cyber threat,
vulnerability, and analysis information."98 It is "devoted exclusively to
cyber indications and warning, intrusion detection, incident analysis,
incident response, information sharing/knowledge management, and
planning."99
DISA's mission is clearly critical to the overall cybersecurity of the
United States. Without reliable military command and control and
communications infrastructure, the ability for the U.S. to use its
superior military force is diminished.
93 Id. at 208. (Transition to Net Centric Environment, Eliminate Bandwidth Constraints,
GIG Network Operations and Defense, Exploit the GIG for Improved Decision Making,
Deliver Capabilities Effectively/Efficiently).
94 Id. (emphasis added).
95 Id. at 217. (emphasis added).
96 Id. at 218.
97 Id. at 219.
98 Id. at 221.
99 Id.
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VI. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
As a member of the Intelligence Community, the National Security
Agency (NSA) collects, analyzes, and produces "signals intelligence
information and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
purposes to support national and departmental missions."100 With
respect to cybersecurity, the Director of NSA is also the National
Manager for National Security Systems and responsible to the
Secretary of Defense for the protection of national security systems.10'
There has always been tension between operational combat
commanders and the intelligence organizations that support them.
According to Michael Handel:
Intelligence is of the utmost importance in war, but it is
not a prerequisite for military conflict or even victory.
The best intelligence is impotent without military
strength, while military strength without intelligence
can nevertheless accomplish its objectives though
probably at a higher cost. Consequently, military
organizations have traditionally viewed the operational
branch, the fighting forces, as their central concern at
all times. 102
Military commanders demand certainty and predictability.
Intelligence agencies tend to deliver uncertain and qualified
judgments. In a paper concerning the Intelligence Community's
performance in Afghanistan, the then-Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence for the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan said that "because the United States has focused the
overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower
on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable
to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we
operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade."103
100 Exec. Order No. 12333 (2008).
101 See 40 U.S.C. § 11103.
102 INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 65-66 (Michael I. Handel ed., 1990).
103 MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL T. FLYNN, U.S.A., CAPTAIN MArT POTTINGER & PAUL D.
BATCHELOR, FIXING INTEL: A BLUEPRINT FOR MAKING INTELLIGENCE RELEVANT IN
AFGHANISTAN 4 (2010), available at http://wwx-.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/
AfghanIntelFlynnJan2010_code5o7_voices.pdf.
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Because NSA is an agency within the Department of Defense and
because it is now co-located with a cyber combat command, there may
be tensions between the operational priorities of Cyber Command and
those of the NSA. Despite these potential tensions, as discussed above,
there is great wisdom in co-locating Cyber Command with NSA.
The National Security Agency is the world's preeminent signals
intelligence organization.1o4 Not only is it responsible for the collection
and analysis of foreign diplomatic, military, and commercial
communications, but it also is charged with securing U.S.
communications from interception. Part of the agency's mission
includes enabling "Computer Network Operations (CNO) in order to
gain a decision advantage for the Nation and our allies under all
circumstances."1o5
An example of the cybersecurity benefits derived from NSA is the
Department of Homeland Security's EINSTEIN program. Under this
program, the Department of Homeland Security is partnering with an
Internet service provider to test technology that detects unauthorized
intrusions into government computer systems using capabilities
developed by the National Security Agency.106 The automation of this
malware detection is meant to prevent attacks before damage is done
to federal information systems or data is stolen or manipulated within
federal databases. "EINSTEIN 3's predecessors focused on intrusion
detection, allowing analysts to scan records of connections to agencies'
systems and use signatures to scan network traffic for cyber
threats. EINSTEIN 3 would add the ability to prevent those
intrusions."1o7 This effort will improve DHS's information sharing by
providing an automated process for alerting other agencies about
network intrusions.
As illustrated by the EINSTEIN technology, NSA and the
intelligence community may have insight into the working of terrorist
organizations that seek to damage U.S. interests using the Internet.
104 See generally JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 31 (4th ed.,
1999). (Signals intelligence includes communications intelligence and electronic
intelligence).
105 NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, NSA/CSS STRATEGY (2010), available at
http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss-strategy.pdf.
106 Ben Bain, DHS Releases New Details on EINSTEIN 3 Intrusion Prevention Pilot,
FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK (Mar. 19, 2010), available at
http://fcw.com/articles/2010/03/19/einstein-3-test-intrusion-prevention-system.aspx.
1o7 Id.
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According to the Congressional Research Service, "Terrorist
organizations exploit the Internet medium to raise awareness for their
cause, to spread propaganda, and to inspire potential operatives
across the globe. Websites operated by terrorist groups can contain
graphic images of supposed successful terrorist attacks, lists and
biographies of celebrated martyrs, and forums for discussing ideology
and methodology."108 The global reach and resident analytical skill of
the intelligence community-including NSA-provides enormous
advantage to U.S. cybersecurity.
Under the National Cyber Incident Response Plan, the intelligence
community is tasked with providing advanced warning and
characterization of a cyber attack. In concert with the Department of
Defense, the intelligence community will "characterize the cyber
threat and attribution of attacks and to forestall future incidents."o9
Intelligence agencies are also tasked with establishing situational
awareness with DHS and "other partners" and to share intelligence on
threats in and from cyberspace with the private sector and "especially
the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) community."11o
The Department of Defense and the intelligence community
operate under some distinct legal authorities however. This is both a
benefit and a liability in terms of cybersecurity. According to General
Alexander, a cyberspace destructive attack "is coming, in my opinion.
It is a question of time." He noted that the timing of this attack is
unknown and that he cannot predict if this event will be against
"commercial infrastructure, government networks or mobile
platforms."','
A cyber conflict may be inevitable, but the Defense Department
does not possess the inherent legal authority or capacity to respond to
all cyber threats unilaterally. As with a natural disaster, timely and
effective interagency coordination is necessary to synchronize and
108 CATHERINE A. THEOHARY & JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RES. SERV., R41674, TERRORIST USE
OF THE INTERNET: INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE 3 (2011), available at
http://ww w.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/Terroist%2oUse%200/2olnternet%201
O.pdf.
109 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN, E-1 (2010)
[hereinafter NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN], available at
http://www.federalnewsradio.com/pdfs/NCIRPInterimVersionSeptember_2010.pdf.
11o Id.
111 Donna Miles, Alexander Cites Need for Greater Cyber Defenses, AMERICAN FORCES
PRESS SERV., (Sept. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov,/news/newsarticle.aspx?id= 65321.
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focus all instruments of national power against current and emerging
cyber threats.112 DoD currently has no authority to guard networks
other than the GIG. Yet, threats to the U.S. may pass through multiple
other networks, foreign and domestic, before putting DoD at risk. NSA
can monitor foreign communications outside the U.S., but can do
nothing to mitigate a threat it may see coming. Despite the technical
brilliance resident at NSA, the agency and the intelligence community
must develop close relationships with the Department of Homeland
Security to execute a unified homeland defense strategy.
Both the Defense Department and the intelligence community
must protect information systems that are required to perform their
missions. Both federal elements know how to detect cyber intrusions,
protect essential networks, and respond to threats to U.S. interests.
According to Franklin Kramer, however, "the technical solutions for
securing civilian infrastructure vulnerability and espionage are either
not available or not well understood."113 Kramer notes that the
"creation of an effective technical architecture with adequate
situational awareness, resilience and interoperability will be a
significant challenge."114
The weakness of the intelligence community and NSA is cultural.
The multi-billion dollar intelligence community produces the most
sensitive information available to the government and, therefore, has
many more personnel with higher security clearances. The military's
average clearance level is still higher than that of DHS, but it still
doesn't match that of an intelligence agency.
VII. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
As the key source of legal guidance within the executive branch,
the Justice Department is a necessary partner in U.S. cybersecurity,
especially because clear laws governing some unique aspects of
cybersecurity have yet to be written. For example, determining what
actions against the U.S. justify retaliation is a question that the
department must consider. The lack of cyber-experienced attorneys
112 James Barkley, Kevin Campbell, Joseph Roybal, Interagency Coordination @ Net
Speed: Recommendations to Maximize Interagency Coordination and Capabilities (US
CYBERCOM 26, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) (on file with
author).
113 KRAMER, supra note 20, at 3.
114 Id.
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challenges almost all branches of the department. Although there may
be a sufficient number of attorneys with military experience, very few
of them have military cyber experience. This limits their ability to
provide guidance for and participate in discussions of cyber conflict
and the emerging authorities for cyber-operational relationships. The
Justice Department will have to explore, debate, and determine
adequate legal guidance for a federal government that relies on
information networks to provide for the U.S. population.
A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Criminal acts in U.S. cyberspace are addressed by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Such acts may be politically motivated; more
often, crimes such as fraud or the theft of intellectual property are
motivated by the pursuit of illicit profit. Some estimate the cost of
cyber crime to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.115 Operational
relationships between the Departments of Homeland Security,
Defense, and Justice are critical because "there is not necessarily a
bright line between national security and criminal objectives: the well-
known [December 2009] attack on Google may be an exemplar of a
hybrid situation."11 6
IX. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
A. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a
Department of Commerce non-regulatory agency and "provides
standards and technology to protect information systems against
threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information
and services."117 NIST's Computer Security Division encourages
"broad sharing of information security tools and practices," and
"provides a resource for information security standards and
guidelines."118
115 See generally NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN, supra note lo9.
116 Id.
117 Computer Security Resource Center, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
http://ww w.nist.gov/itl/csd/csrc.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
ii8 Id.
[Vol. 8:2310
YOUNG
NIST's Computer Security Division fulfills the institute's
responsibilities under Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled the
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).119
Under its FISMA authorities, the Computer Security Division drafted
FISMA compliance guides, "provided specifications for minimum
security requirements for federal information and information
systems," and reviewed "security policies and technologies from the
private sector and national security systems for potential federal
agency use."20
NIST has a vital role to play at the nexus of U.S. government and
the private sector. By statute, "NIST is directed to offer support to the
private sector for the development of precompetitive generic
technologies2l and the diffusion of government-developed innovation
to users in all segments of the American economy."122 Title 15 also
directs NIST to "develop and test standard interfaces, communication
protocols, and data structures for computer and related
telecommunications systems,"23 to "study computer systems and their
use to control machinery and processes,"124 and to "perform research
119 FISMA the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requires each
federal agency to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security
program. The law assigns specific responsibilities to agency heads, chief information
officers, and Inspectors General. It also assigns OMB and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) with responsibilities for oversight and guidance. The
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for overseeing agency information
security policies and practices, including developing and overseeing guidance on
information security and overseeing compliance. NIST is tasked with developing standards
and guidance for implementation of FISMA requirements by federal agencies. (See U.S.
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o7-528, INFORMATION SECURITY: SELECTED
DEPARTMENTS NEED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS (2007)).
120 The Computer Security Division Responds to the Federal Information Security
ManagementAct of2002, COMPUTER SCIENCE DIV., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
http://csrc.nist.gov/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
121 See generally WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RES. SERV., CRS Report 95-36, THE ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 2 (2005), available at
http://ww w.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/95-36.pdf (high-risk [research] ... past the
basic research stage but not yet ready for commercialization).
122 WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RES. SERV. CRS 95-30, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY: AN APPROPRIATIONS OVERVIEW 1 (2011), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/95-3o_20110425.pdf; see also 15 U.S.C. §272(b)(1) (2010).
123 15 U.S.C. § 272(C)(12).
124 Id. at § 272(C)(13).
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to develop standards and test methods to advance the effective use of
computers and related systems and to protect the information stored,
processed, and transmitted by such systems and to provide advice in
support of policies affecting Federal computer and related
telecommunicationssystems."125
FISMA provides government-wide requirements for information
security that supersede the Government Information Security Reform
Act and the Computer Security Act. "Except for national security
systems as defined by FISMA, the Secretary of Commerce is
responsible for prescribing standards and guidelines pertaining to
Federal information systems on the basis of standards and guidelines
developed by NIST."2 6
NIST and the National Security Agency cooperatively evaluate
information technology conformance with international standards
under the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP). This
cooperative effort is the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme for IT Security (CCEVS). It is a public-private
partnership to "help consumers select commercial off-the-shelf
information technology (IT) products that meet their security
requirements and to help manufacturers of those products gain
acceptance in the global marketplace."127
Although NIST is a vital player in the cybersecurity game, divided
authorities may hobble the federal government's ability to adequately
secure essential information and critical U.S. networks. The
Department of Homeland Security "working with [NIST] and [the
Office of Management and Budget] -defends all '.gov' space; and DoD
defends all of the '.mil' space for military and intelligence
networks."12 8 No federal organization helps protect commercial
networks "where our policy is to rely on some combination of
individual action, encouragement, leadership by example, and faith in
market forces."129
125 Id. at § 27(C)(14).
126 WILLIAM C. BARKER, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDELINE FOR IDENTIFYING AN
INFORMATION SYSTEM AS A NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM 5 (2003), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-59/SP800-59.pdf.
127 Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation, NAT'L INFO. ASSURANCE P'SHIP,
http://ww w.niap-ccevs.org/about (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
128 Coldebella & White, supra note 18, at 7.
129 Id.
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X. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
Considerations of the complexities surrounding the cybersecurity
of legislative branch networks are beyond the scope of this article;
however, since there are connections between the networks of both
branches, a few issues should be mentioned. Given the complicated
cybersecurity relationships within the executive branch, it is easy to
overlook the important role the legislative branch plays in setting
funding and policy for U.S. cybersecurity. According to Stephen
Dycus:
Congress obviously cannot act alone to develop a cyber
warfare policy for the United States. Its members and
staff lack the technical expertise, agility, and
organization to wield this new, evolving weaponry. On
the other hand, Congress's job in our constitutional
system is to set national policy for the executive branch
to execute. Especially in the matter of cyber warfare,
where the diplomatic and strategic stakes are
potentially as high as they are in any kinetic conflict,
Congress has a critical role to play. It has perspective
gained from long experience in foreign affairs and a
host of related issues, and it may be more responsive to
the popular will. The solution to this apparent
conundrum may be found in a close collaboration
between the political branches in the planning and
implementation of rules for cyber warfare."'o
Professor Dycus makes the point that U.S. cyberspace actions are still
governed by law. If the nation suffers a significant cyber event that is
determined to be an armed attack under the United Nations Charter,
the "United States' laws and rules must govern the United States'
response-and, in particular, the relationship between the executive
branch and the Congress. An appropriate declaratory policy, as has
been used with respect to other types of potentially serious attacks,
could help create a common executive branch-congressional
understanding." 31
130 Stephen Dycus, Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 155
(2010).
131 KRAMER, supra note 20, at 2.
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XI. NON-FEDERAL SECTOR CYBERSECURITY
OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
External operational relationships are more relevant and
important when the United States is faced with a potential cyber
conflict. The relationships between the U.S. government and the
private sector are critical because the private sector is more likely to
notice a cyber attack before it affects U.S. systems. The majority of the
systems and critical infrastructure on which the federal government
relies are owned and operated by the private sector. Ninety-eight
percent of government communications, including classified data,
travel over "civilian-owned-and-operated networks and systems."132
According to the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, the
relationship between the private sector and the federal government is
insufficient to secure U.S. critical infrastructure. Government and
private cybersecurity efforts remain uncoordinated, allowing malware
to spread "undetected to any location benefiting from the near
absence of security between independent network owners. This lack of
coordination across the public and private sector leaves the user
vulnerable to malevolent behavior that, among a long list of
possibilities, can invade their privacy, steal their identities, deny
critical services, or create conditions in which public confidence in
governmental institutions is diminished."133
There are evolving efforts for coordination between the
government and commercial sectors. Multiple advisory committees
and partnerships with private industry are involved in cybersecurity.
The bodies that attempt to provide stronger public-private
partnerships have been less than successful, however, because there is
no regulatory structure to allow adequate operational relationships
between the public sector and federal departments and agencies. The
Center for Strategy and International Studies points to DoD's Defense
Industrial Base Cyber Pilot and the Enduring Security Framework as
two of the few successful partnerships in government. Their success is
132 Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects ofAttacks, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2010) (quoting Michael McConnell, Former Dir. of Nat'l
Intelligence, from his Keynote Address at the Texas Law Review Symposium: Law at the
Intersection of National Security, Privacy, and Technology).
133 INTELLIGENCE AND NAT'L SEC. ALLIANCE, ADDRESSING CYBER SECURITY THROUGH
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING MODELS (2009), available at
http://www.insaonline.org/assets/files/CyberPaperNov o9R3.pdf.
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based on the "high-level participation by all parties and the existence
of binding contractual relationships."134
The private sector continues to struggle with the costs of
improving security for its information and networks. According to
Larry Clinton of the Internet Security Alliance, "Many companies
don't see an adequate [return on investment] to cyber investments."135
The lack of an adequate business case to encourage greater
cybersecurity creates regulatory dilemmas. Melissa Hathaway3 6 has
offered three options for steepening the "demand curve for
cybersecurity."137 She recommends that the Securities and Exchange
Commission propose a rule governing the thresholds of information
security risk. This would demonstrate the SEC's interest in corporate
information on company information security safeguards.138
Second, Hathaway recommends the Federal Communications
Commission require the "core telecommunications providers and
[internet service providers]...shoulder more of the burden of
protecting our infrastructure." The private sector often tells the
government that private firms are better positioned than government
agencies to detect and mitigate cyber threats. If this is the case, then
the government should endorse the cyber capabilities of the private
sector and capitalize on the "unparalleled visibility into global
networks" of the ISPs.139
134 Coldebella & White, supra note 18, at 4.
135 Examining the Homeland Security Impact of the Obama Administration's
Cybersecurity Proposal: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Sec. Technologies, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Larry Clinton,
President & CEO, Internet Security Alliance), available at http://homeland.house.gov/
sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimonyo20Clintono2oAmended.pdf.
136 President of Hathaway Global Strategies and senior adviser at the Harvard Kennedy
School's Belfer Center led President Obama's Cyberspace Policy Review as National
Security Council acting senior director for cyberspace. Hathaway also led the development
of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative in the Bush White House.
137 See generally MELISSA HATHAWAY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ISSUE BRIEF: CREATING THE
DEMAND CURVE FOR CYBERSECURITY (2010), available at http://www.acus.org/files/
publication-pdfs/403/12161oACUSHathawayCyberDemand.pdf.
138 MELISSA HATHAWAY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ISSUE BRIEF: CREATING THE DEMAND CURVE
FOR CYBERSECURITY 2 (2010), available at http://wwx-.acus.org/files/publication-pdfs/
403/12161o ACUS Hathaway CyberDemand.pdf.
139 Id. at 1.
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Third, the Federal Trade Commission has appropriate authority to
''protect and educate consumers and businesses on the fundamental
importance of good information-security practices."4o Through the
application of a warning banner or notice message, online consumers
can be informed of the risk they are assuming by conducting e-
transactions. These banners are comparable "to the warning labels
found on tobacco and alcohol products, telling consumers they can be
hazardous to their health."41
In October 2011, the SEC issued guidance essentially adopting
Hathaway's recommendations. The new regulation requires public
companies to report "significant instances of cybertheft or attack, or
even when they are at material risk of such an event."42
A. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned the following
responsibilities for the protection of critical infrastructure to DHS:
* developing a comprehensive national plan for
securing the key resources and critical
infrastructures of the United States;
* recommending measures to protect the key
resources and critical infrastructures of the
United States in coordination with other
groups; and
140 Id. at 5.
141 Id.
142 Ellen Nakashima & David S. Hilzenrath, Cybersecurity: SEC Outlines Requirement
That Companies Report Cyber Theft and Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2011,
http://ww w.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cybersecurity-sec-outlines-
requirement-that-companies-report-data-breaches/2011/10/14/glQArGjskL story.html;
see also Div. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC
No. 2 CYBERSECURITY (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
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* disseminating, as appropriate, information to
assist in the deterrence, prevention, and
preemption of or response to terrorist
attacks.143
DHS communicates with the private sector primarily through the
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). In 1998,
Presidential Decision Directive 63 called for the establishment of
ISACs as means to assist with the protection of critical infrastructure.
Yet, "[fWrequent reliance on cooperative councils, like the ISACs, has
produced little more than the repetitive refrain that government can't
share intelligence with the private sector and the private sector sees
little to gain by sharing with the government."144
The strength of DHS's relationship with the private sector is that
DHS has provided a venue to share information, which is necessary
but not sufficient. The weaknesses of this approach, however, is that it
is voluntary and there is no cost to not participating. Private sector
motivation for sharing information with the government is reduced by
the monetary risk of releasing proprietary information to competitors
and the potential liability of releasing customer date, if sued. There is
also the "FOIA" risk. Private sector firms are not subject to Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests for information, but under the
current legal regime any information provided to the government, if
not subject to a FOIA exemption-national security, for example-
could be released to the public.
Within DHS, the National Protection and Programs Directorate
oversees the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and
Communications. The office uses three divisions145 to "prevent or
minimize disruptions to [U.S.] critical information infrastructure in
order to protect the public, economy, government services, and the
overall security of the United States." The CS&C Office seeks to reduce
143 U.S. Gov'TACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-lo-628 , CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION: KEY PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CYBER EXPECTATIONS NEED TO BE CONSISTENTLY
ADDRESSED 7 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dio628.pdf.
144 Paul Rosenzweig, The Organization of the United States Government and Private
Sectorfor Achieving Cyber Deterrence, in DETERRING CYBER ATTACKS: INFORMING
STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 244, 266 (2010).
145 See National Communications System, NAT'L CYBER SECURITY DIV. OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY COMMC'S, http://ww w.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc 1185202475883.shtm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (The three divisions are the National Communications System,
the National Cyber Security Division, and the Office of Emergency Communications.).
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cyber vulnerabilities, guard against cyber intrusions, and anticipate
potential threats.146
However, according to a DHS Inspector General Report from June
2011, CS&C has not adequately addressed cybersecurity risks. The
office has yet to craft a strategic implementation plan to address the
recommendations from the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace,147 or to accomplish the objectives established by the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan or the Comprehensive
National Cyber Security Initiative. According to the IG, "Although
progress has been made in building relationships with the public and
private sectors, raising cybersecurity awareness, and implementing
education and outreach programs, much work remains to protect
cyberspace and the Nation's critical infrastructures from
vulnerabilities and exploits."4 8
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The Defense Department has its own relationships with a small
portion of the private sector known as the Defense Industrial Base.
This effort provides expertise to defense contractors who have "opted-
in" to the program. "Through a public-private partnership called the
Enduring Security Framework (ESF), the chief executive officers and
chief technology officers of major information technology and defense
146 Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://ww w.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc 1185202475883.shtm (last visited Jan. 23,
2012).
147 See THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE (2003), available at
http://ww w.us-cert.gov/reading room/cyberspace-strategy.pdf. The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace outlined a framework for both organizing and prioritizing efforts. It
provides direction to the federal government departments and agencies that have roles in
cyberspace security. It also identifies steps that state and local governments, private
companies and organizations, and individual Americans can take to improve our collective
cybersecurity. The Strategy highlights the role of public-private engagement. The
document provides a framework for the contributions that we all can make to secure our
parts of cyberspace. The dynamics of cyberspace will require adjustments and amendments
to the Strategy over time. See id. at viii.
148 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., PLANNING, MANAGEMENT,
AND SYSTEMS, ISSUES HINDER DHS' EFFORTS To PROTECT CYBERSPACE AND THE NATION'S
CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE (Redacted) 13 (2011), available at
http://www.oig.dhs.govT/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_11-89_Juni1.pdf.
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companies now meet regularly with top officials from DHS, ODNI,
and DoD."49
The benefits of this relationship are faster identification and
application of commercial best practices from top industry leaders.
The ESF addresses how the "technological, operational, and political
factors introduce exposure for the U.S. and opportunity for our
adversaries, identify the means to manage the risk profile for the U.S.
and its allies in this environment, and address today's risk and provide
a permanent forum for continued engagement in tomorrow's
technology marketplace."
The downsides are similar to those in the ISACs-a limited
government ability to share classified information with the private
sector and the private sector's limited inclination to share with
government due to its proprietary concerns and liability issues. The
Department has involved some of its Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
contractors in a pilot program to "improve sharing of information on
cyber threat, alerts, and sensitive data by establishing a new
partnership model."15o This pilot program is governed by voluntary
agreements between DoD and cleared defense contractors. These
contractors receive classified and unclassified cyber threat
information and best practices:
In return, the private sector partners agree to share
cyber intrusion information with the DoD Cyber Crime
Center, which is to serve as the focal point for
information-sharing and digital forensics analysis
activities related to protecting unclassified information
on DIB information systems and networks. DoD's goal
is to transition from pilot to program status and
expand the program to all qualified cleared contractors.
In addition, the officials stated that they expect to
eventually modify DoD contractual language to
encourage contractors to increase cybersecurity in their
networks.151
149 William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2010.
150 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-lo-628, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION: KEY PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CYBER EXPECTATIONS NEED TO BE CONSISTENTLY
ADDRESSED 22 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dio628.pdf.
151 Id. at 23.
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XII. CONCLUSION
The federal government requires adequate operational
relationships that will facilitate information and resource sharing in
times of expanding cybersecurity threats and shrinking federal
budgets. All federal departments and agencies must participate and
contribute to more secure information systems, but the departments
with the largest budgets and most expertise-the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security, and those with greater insight into
the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries-likely have the
most significant contributions to make across the federal government
and the private sector.
The Defense Industrial Base Cyber Pilot conducted by DoD and
the EINSTEIN program initiated by DHS are excellent examples of
collaboration within government and with the private sector. These
initiatives require expansion and maturation. The collaborative efforts
between DoD and DHS in the Joint Coordination Element need to
become stronger vehicles for information sharing and cooperative
planning. Following these recommendations will result in better
avoidance of, preparation for, and recovery from a devastating cyber
attack. The United States government has established good
operational relationships to address the cyber threat, but it must
improve these relationships to be more inclusive and to coordinate at
a much faster pace.
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